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API7:2023 Server-Side Request Forgery

User-controlled URLs are fetched by the server. The attacker steers requests at internal hosts (cloud metadata services, RFC1918 ranges), bypassing perimeter firewalls.

What Vulkro detects​

Vulkro tracks taint from request body / query / path into HTTP client calls (requests.get, axios, fetch, http.Client.Get, etc.) without intervening URL validation or allowlist check.

Non-compliant code (examples)​

Express — user-supplied URL fetched directly

app.post('/webhook/probe', async (req, res) => {
  const r = await fetch(req.body.url);  // attacker hits 169.254.169.254
  res.send(await r.text());
});

Compliant code (examples)​

Express — allowlist host + reject private IPs

const ALLOWED_HOSTS = new Set(['api.partner.com']);
app.post('/webhook/probe', async (req, res) => {
  const url = new URL(req.body.url);
  if (!ALLOWED_HOSTS.has(url.hostname)) return res.status(400).end();
  // also verify resolved IP is not in 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16/12, 192.168/16, 169.254/16, 127.0/8
  const r = await fetch(url.href, { redirect: 'error' });
  res.send(await r.text());
});

See also​

  • Confidence model - what High, Medium, and Low mean for findings in this category.
  • Safety - what Vulkro does and does not access on your machine.

References​

This page is generated by vulkro rules export <out-dir> from the catalog in src/rule_docs.rs. Edits made by hand are overwritten on the next regeneration.

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